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Commentary: Convergence as Movement:
Toward a Counter-Hegemonic Approach to
Corporate Governance*
KELLYE Y. TESTY
One of the most frequently discussed topics in corporate governance during
the past several years has been that of "convergence." Briefly stated, the
convergence discussion focuses upon whether the increasing international-
ization of capital markets and commerce will and should result in the har-
monization of corporate governance standards across national boundaries.
Within this discussion, some scholars and policymakers tout conversion as
imminent, inevitable, and invaluable (e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman 2001).
Others expect harmonization of national corporate governance standards to
be slowed by path-dependent factors such as local cultural values and the
broader political and legal economies of the nation-states (e.g., Bebchuck &
Roe 1999; Gilson 1996, 2001; Roe 1996).
In addition to these differences of view pertaining to expected rates of
convergence, writers also debate convergence in terms of its source. Some
anticipate that convergence will be a formal matter, stemming from changes
that would align countries' positive law with one another (e.g., Hansmann &
Kraakman 2001). Still others rely upon a more functional view of converg-
ence, noting that positive law is often trumped by the effects of "soft" law
such as exchange listing standards, voluntary corporate codes of conduct,
and other business and regulatory norms (e.g., Black 2001; Branson 2001;
Coffee 1999b, 2001; Gilson 1996).
While these discussions of convergence have been abundant and robust,
they also have been sorely mislabeled. What has been characterized as con-
vergence is, at heart, a discussion of Anglo-American hegemony. Convergence,
after all, means "to move or be directed toward each other or toward the
same place, purpose, or result" (Grove 1976). The only significant move-
ment in Anglo-American corporate governance standards, however, is as an
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exported commodity being sold to both developed and developing nations
(Mitchell 2001). Moreover, these hegemonic tendencies are not confined
solely to academics. For instance, large institutional investors in the United
States continue to pressure European firms to adopt Anglo-American
governance standards (Williams 2002:741-42, n 121). What is absent from
most of these discussions of convergence is the willingness to engage the
question of whether Anglo-American corporate governance standards
might themselves be in need of some realignment.
At this post-Enron juncture in U.S. corporate law, that question can no
longer be ignored. For some time, a persistent minority of corporate law
scholars has asserted that American corporate governance is itself in need of
change (e.g., Greenfield 2002; Mitchell 1995, 2001; O'Connor 1991; Testy
2002). Though wide-ranging in critique, these writers are largely unified in
their concern that American corporate law's emphasis on shareholder primacy
is misplaced. Kent Greenfield (2002) captures the essence of these progressive
corporate law scholars' concerns well: in critiquing shareholder primacy
through the lens of corporations' role in the tragedy of the 11 September
2001 attacks on New York's World Trade Centers, he concludes that
[w]hen all is said and done, all one can say persuasively is that a shareholder-
oriented model of corporate law is better for shareholders. It is quite difficult
to say it is better for society as a whole, or for the economy, or for other
stakeholders. It is even difficult to say it is better for the firm itself. (Greenfield
2002:1428)
In the context of the convergence debate, it is likewise difficult to say that it
is better for other nations' firms, for the many constituents of those firms, or
for the societies of those nations.
Indeed, there is proof to the contrary. In the United States, each day's
news brings yet another round of corporate earnings restatements, as large
corporate concerns continue to uncover accounting and other improprieties
in the wake of the scandals of companies such as Enron and World Com.'
Each day's news also brings yet another round of corporate layoffs,
cutbacks, and closings, with the concomitant disruptions to employees,
suppliers, and communities. Moreover, looking outside of the United States,
a number of privatized economies continue to be unable to flourish under
American-style market systems that were put into operation despite
significant differences in institutional structures available to support those
systems (Coffee 1999a). Most everywhere, societal harms such as wealth
inequality and environmental degradation continue to increase at alarming
rates (Greenfield 2002; Testy 2002).
Accordingly, a complex and urgent question is put into bold relief.
Attention must be trained on the task of critically assessing the question of
what elements of corporate governance will enhance rather than retard
societal flourishing. What will be required is a measured consideration of the
fundamental questions of effective corporate governance, including open-
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ness to the distinct possibility that unmodified American-style governance
may not be the right choice for the United States, let alone for other nations.
More specifically, to develop such a counter-hegemonic approach to corporate
governance will require a thicker, or more situated, critical assessment of
alternative corporate governance systems as well as a recognition of the
political questions inherent in discussions of corporate governance.
In their own ways, each of the three corporate governance articles in this
issue makes a needed contribution toward that effort. In "The Bonding
Effects of Directors' Statutory Wage Liability: An Interactive Corporate
Governance Explanation," Ron Davis (2002) cogently examines Canadian
corporate and employment law standards that hold directors personally
liable upon the corporation's insolvency for wage and benefit claims owed
to employees. Through Triantis and Daniels' "interactive model of corporate
governance," Davis views employee compensation liability as a form of
direct "voice" that can control managerial slack (ibid.:41 1).
Arguing against current efforts to repeal this directorial liability, Davis
makes a strong case that it is not only fair but also efficient to hold directors
responsible for the firm's debts to employees (ibid.:413). Employee com-
pensation liability is efficient in Davis's view because it provides directors
two countervailing incentives to avoid insolvency. First (unlike directorial
liability for torts, regulatory offences, and environmental damage), liability
for wage claims does not have the likelihood of encouraging directors to
engage in overly low (or negative) net present value investments that
increase the potential for corporate insolvency. Second, personal liability for
wage claims also provides directors the incentive to "resist the opportunistic
risk taking desired by shareholders" when the corporation is in the "vicinity
of insolvency" (ibid.:418). Thus, just as directors are dissuaded from taking
too little risk that may lead to insolvency, they are likewise discouraged
from taking too much risk, the burden of which falls upon creditors in a
scheme of limited shareholder liability.
Several aspects of Davis's work demonstrate elements of the counter-
hegemonic approach to corporate governance identified above. First, though
his article is just part of a larger project, even here Davis delves deeply into
Canadian corporate law, not merely in isolation but as situated in a larger
legal, political, and cultural framework. Second, Davis paints with a careful
brush, negotiating what is often misguidedly presented as a sharp and
inevitable dichotomy between fairness and efficiency by showing that wage
liability can serve both ends. Similarly, rather than viewing director liability
as an all or nothing proposition, he thoughtfully discriminates based on the
source of liability, distinguishing employee compensation liability from
directorial liability for torts, regulatory offenses, and environmental
damage. This distinction opens the door to further consideration of whether
there might be other forms of director liability that would be both fair and
efficient. It also stands in stark contrast to the fact that American corporate
law has witnessed sharp cutbacks in director liability through statutory
(0 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002
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amendments that permit broad exculpatory provisions in the corporate
charter (e.g., Delaware General Corporate Law §102[b][7]).
Finally, Davis' article also refuses yet another classic assumption: that
employees and creditors are separate stakeholder groups. Instead, Davis
thoughtfully demonstrates the unsecured creditor aspects of the employee's
situation, and again opens an important door for further research and
reflection. Specifically, are there other creditor-protection mechanisms that
might be appropriately extended to employees to enhance their role in
corporate governance? Conversely, would such creditor-protection mechan-
isms for employees instead reduce the salience of employee's claims for an
enhanced governance role in the corporation?
Like Davis, John Cioffi also contributes to a counter-hegemonic approach
to corporate governance in his article, "Restructuring 'Germany, Inc.': The
Politics of Company and Takeover Law Reform in Germany and the
European Union." In it, he provides a fascinating account of the 1998
passage of KonTraG, the Corporate Control and Transparency Act - "the
only major reform of German company law since 1965" (2002:356). Cioffi
first traces how KonTraG's passage was fueled by the political manipulation
of populist fears of concentrated financial power, resulting in substantial
reforms incorporating Anglo-American corporate governance structures
within German law for their perceived democratizing effects (ibid.).
Once the pro-takeover implications of these reforms became apparent,
however, German political and economic elites ultimately retarded further
Americanization of takeover law in Germany and in the European Union
(EU) by generating a backlash against the American emphasis on the
market for corporate control. "Ironically, this backlash took its final form
in the legislative sanction of the very anti-takeover defenses commonly used
in the United States" (ibid.:389). Thus, as is common in the United States,
the interests of communities, employees, and suppliers were used as a trope
for entrenching management and maintaining existing power relations in
society.
With a work that is immersed in the German and EU political economies,
Cioffi surfaces and centers the political questions increasingly played out in
corporate governance reform. Beginning by noting that "in an era in which
state-led intermediation appears to be receding, corporate governance
regimes perform an increasingly important intermediation function in the
coordination of opposing political constituencies and bodies of regulation,"
he concludes by lamenting that "ideological commitments collide and con-
strain attempts to advance agendas of structural change" (ibid.:356, 389).
While that is certainly so, it is refreshing to see the questions of corporate
governance treated as the political power questions that they indeed are.
Unless and until questions of corporate governance are understood as
questions of power, "reform" efforts will simply reinscribe existing societal
inequalities rather than alleviate them. Accordingly, a counter-hegemonic
approach to corporate governance demands interdisciplinary analyses,
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002
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needing "outsider" insights of political scientists such as Cioffi, just as it also
would benefit from increased attention by, for instance, critical race
theorists, environmental justice advocates, and feminists.
Lest it be thought that a counter-hegemonic approach to corporate
governance is beyond the reach of lawyers and legal academics, however,
one need only look to Sarra and Nakahigashi's "Balancing Social and
Corporate Culture in the Global Economy: the Evolution of Japanese
Corporate Structure and Norms" (2002). This article is an excellent piece of
collaborative, comparative scholarship. It is extraordinarily striking in its
explicit consideration of the corporation in society; for too often matters of
corporate law are discussed in the abstract, unmoored from the particular
social context in which corporations operate. Though common, this
tendency toward abstraction and detachment is particularly odd given that
corporations operate only through individuals, individuals with unique
social locations. Sarra and Nakahigashi understand this point; indeed, their
work is pleasantly suffused with it.
Sarra and Nakahigashi address the "perception in North America that
Japanese corporations have shifted to an Anglo-American model of
corporate governance" (ibid.:299). Owing in large part to their cultural
perspective, but also to their careful and complete assessment of the full
range and impact of amendments to Japan's Commercial Code that will
take effect in 2003, Sarra and Nakahigashi find the "reality is more
"layered" (ibid.). The layering stems from many sources, including norms
of corporate rescue (ibid.:308); ethical concerns with corporate control
transactions (ibid.:330); an emphasis on enterprise wealth rather than
shareholder wealth (ibid.:329); corporate auditing assignments that are
often rewards for long service rather than independence of judgment
(ibid.:337); and norms of egalitarianism and appreciation for the role of
human capital in an enterprise (ibid.:319).
Among other benefits, Sarra's and Nakahigashi's work also reveals the
historical character of many current discussions of corporate governance.
Although often implicit, convergence discussions echo the view that many
nations have corporate governance systems more primitive than the United
States, and thus need to evolve toward the enlightened American mode.
Sarra and Nakahigashi's work makes clear that this alleged progression may
in fact be a regression, noting that "early Japanese corporate governance
reflected elements of what is now recognized as the Anglo-American model.
However by the early 1900s, this model had fallen into decline and there was
substantial concentration of wealth, and the entrenchment of very large
Japanese corporations, zaibatsu, each consisting of a holding company and
numerous production companies" (ibid.:305). To my American ear, this
description sounds eerily familiar. It is also, as Sarra and Nakahigashi note,
ironic that Japan is again moving toward this Anglo-American system,
precisely at the time that failures of that model are so patent in the United
States.
© Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 2002
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While acknowledging the weaknesses in a wholesale American-model of
corporate governance, Sarra and Nakahigashi do not celebrate all aspects
of Japanese governance structures. For instance, they note that its emphasis
on protecting the long-term worker may fail to protect women to the
same extent as it does men. This is due to women's systemic exclusion from
many long-term employment options despite formal law to the contrary
(ibid.:xxx). Sarra has developed elsewhere at more length a feminist analysis
of corporate governance, again to her credit, for its evident consideration of
the relationship between societal inequalities and corporate law and policy
(Sarra 2002).
In conclusion, Sarra and Nakahigashi posit that there are several positive
aspects to Japanese corporate governance structures, including its commit-
ments to employee interests and generally broader view of the corporation's
role in society. In addition to the positive aspects of Japanese governance
structures that Sarra and Nakahigashi note, one could also look to Japan's
system for other insights such as a more just model of wages. Susan Stabile
has noted that "the gap in pay between U.S. executives and rank and file
workers is currently 419 times the pay of average employees, the
corresponding pay gap in Japan [is] in the range of twenty or thirty to
one" (2001). Increased pay equity should surely be added to the list of
positive features of the Japanese system.
Importantly, though, Sarra and Nakahigashi also bring to surface a key
normative point, one that is also implicit in Davis's and Cioffi's
contributions.
We suggest that there are positive elements to these features and that in the
race to global capital, there should be some consideration of the contribution
that Japanese norms and practices can make to effective corporate
governance. (Sarra & Nakahigashi 2002:300)
Indeed there should be careful consideration of the contribution that
Japanese norms and practices make, just as the norms and practices of
Germany, Canada, and other nations' norms and practices should also be
considered. What Sarra and Nakahigashi see is that the question of what the
elements of an effective corporate governance standard for an increasingly
integrated global marketplace should be is still open. It is more likely to be
answered by considering, and then combining, some of the most effective
elements of several systems than imposing any one system on all nations.
Moreover, such an approach would help the convergence discussion live up
to its label, making it a discussion about social progress and justice, not one
merely about American hegemony.
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NOTE
1. See http://integrationsolutions.westlaw.com/corporatescandals.
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